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THE PROBLEM OF THE INDETERMINATE DEFENDANT 




 The article discusses the problem of the indeterminate defendant in European tort law systems 
and in the projects aiming to unify tort law in Europe, such as Draft Common Frame of Reference 
and Principles of European Tort Law.  
 The given issue relates to a situation where there is a damage caused by one factor, yet upon 
available evidence one may indicate a few potential factors which might have led to the damage, 
but it cannot be ascertained which factor was the actual cause of it. The problem is addressed with 
reference to two scenarios. First, when there is a limited and known number of persons acting 
tortiously, each of whom potentially might have led to the damage, but only one of them had 
actually caused it. Second, when it is certain that one tortfeasor from the undetermined group  
of tortfeasors caused damage to some of the injured persons from the group of the injured persons, 
but it cannot be established precisely which tortfeasor caused damage to precisely which injured 
person.  
 In comparative law analysis, one may find various attempts to deal with the given issue, which 
come from the balance of ratios given to different solutions, as well as the legal possibilities  
or obstacles in national tort law systems. The main possibilities are: all-or-nothing approach, joint 
and several liability, and proportional liability. Those solutions are discussed in article in more 
detail with conclusion that the bold proposition of proportional liability presented in Principles  
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 2.1.  ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH 
 
 The all-or-nothing approach is a result of a strict interpretation of the 
conditio sine qua non requirement. Case-law and doctrine in some European 
countries support this view. It is, then, crucial to establish a causal relation 
between the individually recognised tortfeasor and the damage and hold 
him/her liable in full16. Taking into account that the essence of problem  
of alternative causation is inherent evidentiary problems in establishing 
which tortfeasor actually caused the damage, some jurisdictions in which 
the all-or-nothing approach is accepted are using certain ways to overcome 
those difficulties for the plaintiff’s benefit. For example, in Belgium the 
court may be willing to find upon circumstances of the case that the 
damage was actually the result of the activity of one of defendants (his/her 
act was the actual cause of damage) and hold him/her liable17. In some 
jurisdictions facilitation for the plaintiff’s claim follows from the proper 
establishment of the standard of proof or burden of proof. In English18  
and Danish law the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance  
of evidence, which means that the requirement of causation is met if it is 
more probable than not (more than 50%) that the defendant caused  
the damage. A similar approach is taken by Italian law, which applies  
the “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicated ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
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I. Introduction
The number of immigrants, including people seeking international 
protection, who are approaching Europe, is the highest since the end 
of World War II1. According to Eurostat, “the 28 Member States of 
the European Union (EU) granted protection status to 710,400 asylum 
seekers in 2016, more than double the number of 2015. (…) The number 
of decisions granting protection status to Syrians has more than doubled 
since 2015: they were the largest group granted protection status in 
nineteen Member States in 2016.”2.
However, Russia is also affected by the migration crisis. According 
to the most recent data, in 2016 Russia hosted 1,300 refugees from Syria 
(out of 272,000 recognised refugees who were present in Russia)3 and 
registered 22,000 new arrivals of refugees4. Furthermore, 3,039 applications 
were still pending5 and 21,995 persons were granted complementary 
protection status in Russia (in a format of temporary asylum) and 39 
persons received refugee status6. Nevertheless, a decreasing trend in 
w arrivals can be noticed – the highest inflow occurred in 2014 and it 
declined by half in 20157.
In times of unprecedented arrivals of immigrants, countries face 
increasing challenges as regards ensuring human rights in accordance
1 L. DePillis, K. Saluja, D. Lu, A visual guide to 75 years of major refugee crises around 
the world, “Washington Post” of 21.12.2015, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.
com/graphics/world/historical-migrant-crisis/ [last accessed: 9.6.2017].
2 Eurostat, Asylum decisions in the EU. EU Member States granted protection to more than 
700 000 asylum seekers in 2016. Over half of the beneficiaries were Syrians., Eurostat news release 
2017, no. 17, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8001715/3-
26042017-AP-EN.pdf/05e315db-1fe3-49d1-94ff-06f7e995580e [last accessed: 23.5.2017], p. 1.
3 UNHCR, Global Focus 2016 Year-End report. Operation: Russian Federation, 
available at: http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/pdfsummaries/GR2016-
RussianFederation-eng.pdf [last accessed on: 6.10.2017], p. 4.
4 UNHCR, Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2016, UNHCR 2017, available 
at: http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34/global-trends-forced-
displacement-2016.html?query=Russia [last accessed on: 6.10.2017], p. 19.
5 Ibid., p. 62.
6 Ibid., Table 10.
7 Ibid., p. 41.
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with the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (the 1950 Convention)8 and the 1951 Geneva Convention on 
the Status of Refugees (the 1951 Geneva Convention)9, among others. In 
that respect it should be noted that “In the Russian Federation, difficulties 
accessing asylum procedures were reported in the first half of 2017”10. 
The Russian government has already started actions aiming at improving 
asylum processing claims, among other matters11. Bearing in mind that in 
2015 there were 598,617 foreigners living in Russia12, it can be assumed 
that Russia will still be considered as an important transit and destination 
country by immigrants and asylum seekers. Therefore, reflections are 
timely on the material and procedural aspects of ensuring respect for 
rights which are guaranteed by Article 2 and 3 of the 1950 Convention.
Themes covered by this research serve as a ground for a comparison 
of the standards which are provided by the 1951 Geneva Convention, 
the 1950 Convention, Russian legislation, and the European Union laws 
on asylum. Inclusion of the EU norms is justified by the fact that this 
regional institution considers its standards as equal or higher than those 
established by the Council of Europe13.
Thus, I firmly believe that the European Court of Human Rights 
(the ECtHR) judgment of 14 February 2017 in the S.K. v. Russia14 case in 
which the Court reiterated and clarified the importance of an individual 
assessment of:
8 Available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [last 
accessed: 25.2.2017].
9 Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10 [last accessed: 6.5.2017]. It was 
amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
10 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Regional update – 
Europe. Prepared for Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme Sixty-eighth 
session in Geneva (2-6 October 2017), 22 September 2017, available at: http://www.unhcr.
org/excom/orginfo/59c8fd827/europe-regional-update.html?query=Russia [last accessed 
on: 6.10.2017], p. 2.
11 Ibid.
12 Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), Международная Миграция [International 
Migration], Москва 8.7.2016. The document does not indicate the methodology of collecting 
and analysing the above-mentioned data.
13 See Article 52(3) of the 2000 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(OJ EC C 364/1 of 18.12.2000).
14 Appl. no. 52722/15.
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• “continuing hostilities in Syria” (an issue of refugees sur place),
• a continuous prolongation of detention of migrants who have no 
prospects of being returned, and
• an internal flight alternative.
is interesting from an academic as well as from a practical point of view.
II. The facts of the case
In October 2011, S.K. (the applicant) came to Russia from Syria. He did not 
leave the destination country, although the validity of his visa expired15. 
On the contrary, he developed family ties with a Russian citizen to whom 
he got married (in April 2014) and fathered a child (in November 2013).
In February 2013, he was found guilty of committing the administrative 
offence of unlawful employment in Russia. Two years later, the Court in 
Makhachkala (Dagestan Republic of Russia) imposed a fine and ordered 
a penalty of forcible removal of the applicant from Russia. To secure the 
enforcement of that decision, the Court placed S.K. in a special detention 
c ntr  f r foreigners. That decision was appealed against by S.K. in 
February 2015 by referring to his family ties with Russian citizens.
In March 2015, the Supreme Court of the Dagestan Republic upheld 
the decision. It underlined that “[the applicant’s] prolonged violation 
of the migration legislation since October 2012 amounts to abuse of 
Russia’s hospitality and thus should be treated as a breach of the receiving 
country’s interests”.16
Nevertheless, the administrative removal decision was not initiated. 
This was a result of the fact that S.K. applied for temporary asylum. 
He claimed that upon his return to Syria he would be drafted to the 
government’s active military service. Therefore, according to the applicant, 
his life and physical integrity would be put into danger.
In August 2015, the local migration authority decided not to grant 
temporary asylum to S.K. This decision was upheld in September 2015 by
15 According to F. Düvell this is the most common path leading to an illegal stay. 
F. Düvell, The Pathways in and out of Irregular Migration in the EU: A Comparative Analysis, 
“European Journal of Migration and Law” 2011, vol. 13, p. 247.
16 Quoted after the S.K., par. 12.
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the Russian Federal Migration Service. It underlined that “The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs points out that Syrian nationals who return to their 
homeland or who are deported or expelled there may arrive in Damascus 
and then proceed to other regions that are controlled by governmental 
forces”17.
The applicant did not agree with that decision and asked Leninskiy 
District Court of Makhachkala to suspend his removal. He referred to 
the fact that he sought a judicial review of the refusal on granting him 
a temporary protection. In December 2015, the Basmannyy District Court 
of Moscow refused to grant him temporary asylum. The court claimed 
that temporary asylum could be granted only in case of:
“a grave medical condition for which the foreigner will not re eive the 
requisite medical care in the country of nationality, thus putting his or her 
life at risk; a real threat to his or her life or liberty on account of hunger, 
epidemics, emergency situations of environmental or industrial origin or on 
account of an internal or international conflict that encompasses the entire 
territory of the state of nationality; a real threat of being subjected to torture 
or another cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in the 
country of nationality.”18.
In June 2016, the Moscow City Court dismissed S.K.’s app al. It 
underlined that the applicant had not met the prerequisites specified 
in the domestic legislation on refugees, as he had not delivered specific 
facts to prove an exposure to persecution which he would face after being 
returned to Syria. Finally, the Court “noted” that the applicant asked for 
temporary protection after 4 years of staying in Russia19.
III. Scope of the Claim
The application was submitted on 12 November 2015. The applicant 
(a Syrian national, S.K.) based his request by referring to:
17 Quoted after Ibid., par. 18.
18 Quoted after Ibid., par. 21.
19 Quoted after Ibid., par. 22.
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• Article 2 and 3 of the 1950 Convention – claiming that his 
administrative removal from Russia to Syria would expose him 
to a serious risk of ill-treatment due to the general situation of 
violence in Syria;
• Article 5 – claiming that the continuing prolongation of his 
administrative detention was arbitrary and unnecessary, because 
his removal to Syria could not be executed;
• Article 8 and 13 – claiming that his removal was disproportionate, 





Article 1A of the 1951 Geneva Convention provides a definition of a term 
“a refugee”. However, it does not specify the moment in time when one 
becomes a refugee. This may not be at stake when an individual leaves 
his/her country of origin after being persecuted. However, it will have 
an unquestionable impact on people who are in need of international 
protection owing to actions which occurred after their departure20, 
even though their decision to leave had been taken “without fear [of 
persecution, but] for some other purpose, for example, a holiday or 
study”21.
Looking at the universal system of protection of human rights, bearing 
in mind a duty imposed on the signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention 
20 S. Da Lomba, The EU Qualification Directive and Refugees Sur Place [in:] F.A.N.J. 
Goudappel, H.S. Raulusu (eds.), The future of asylum in the European Union. Problems, 
proposals and human rights, The Hague 2011, pp. 43-64.
21 G. Clayton, Textbook on Immigration and Asylum Law, 7th ed., Oxford 2016, p. 448. 
Similar examples are provided in: A. Zimmermann, C. Mahler, Article 1A, para. 2 1951 
Convention [in:] A. Zimmermann, J. Dörschner, F. Machts, The 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary, Oxford 2011, p. 329. Compare 
with: G. S. Goodwin-Gill, J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford/New York 
2007, . 63.
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to cooperate with the UNHCR22, the UNHCR “Handbook” is a very useful 
support as regards the concept of refugees sur place23. Even though it is 
“just” a soft-law instrument24, it has an uncontested influence on the case 
law of national and international courts25.
In the above-cited document, the UNHCR claims that a person is 
ipso facto a refugee when s/he meets the criteria outlined in the 1951 
Geneva Convention. Thus, a formal decision taken by authorities to 
grant refugee status confirms (recognises) that an individual has fulfilled 
preconditions specified in that Convention. Therefore, the UNHCR opted 
for a declaratory view26. Scholars add that an opposite (constitutivist) 
view is “at odds with the [1950] Refugee Convention”27.
A risk sur place may be a consequence of:
• a changing situation in the country of origin or
• activities undertaken by an individual after leaving the country 
of origin28.
22 Article 35(1) of the 1951 Geneva Convention. More in: B. Gronowska, Instytucjonalne 
gwarancje ochrony praw człowieka [Institutional guarantees of human rights protection] [in:] 
B. Gronowska, T. Jasudowicz, M. Balcerzak, M. Lubiszewski, R. Mizerski, Prawa człowieka 
i ich ochrona, Toruń 2010, p. 134.
23 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, December 2011, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3, available at: http://www.
refworld.org/docid/4f33c8d92.html [last accessed: 18.2.2017], point 28.
24 J. Chlebny, Postępowanie w sprawie o nadanie status uchodźcy [A Refugee Status 
Determination Procedure], Warszawa 2011, p. 37. Its role was contested by: H. Storey, The 
Internal Flight Alternative Test: The Jurisprudence Re-examined, “International Journal of 
Refugee Law” 1998, vol. 10, issue 3, p. 507.
25 Among others, the ECtHR refers to the definition of refugees sur place, which can 
be found in the UNHCR’s “Handbook” when Strasbourg judges consider non-refoulement 
claims grounded on Article 3 of the 1950 Convention.
26 See also: C. Costello, E. Hancox, The Recast Asylum Procedure Directive 2013/32/EU: 
Caught between the Stereotypes of the Abusive Asylum-Seeker and the Vulnerable Refugee [in:] 
V. Chetail, P. De Bruycker, F. Maiani (eds.), Reforming the Common European Asylum 
System: The New European Refugee Law, Leiden/Boston 2016, p. 379.
27 H. Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law, Leiden/Boston 2006, p. 455; 
C. Costello, The Human Rights of Migrants and Refugees in European Law, Oxford 2016, p. 64; 
F. Cherubini, Asylum Law in the European Union, New York 2015, pp. 96-97.
28 S. Da Lomba, supra note 20, pp. 46-47, A. Zimmermann, C. Mahler, supra note 
21, p. 329-334, S. Velluti, Reforming the Common European Asylum System — Legislative
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The first group of risks is “objective” risks sur place, whereas the second 
is “subjective” risk sur place29. According to A. Zimmermann, J. Dörschner, 
and F. Machts the majority of asylum seekers refer to the former risks30. 
S. Velluti underlines that even though in principle, sur place claims must 
be assessed on the same basis as all other claims for refugee status, 
a reluctance in that regard can be noticed31.
According to the UNHCR “a coup d’état, change of government, 
significant change in government policy, outbreak or escalation or armed 
conflict, or the disclosure of the names of asylum applicants to officials in 
the country of origin”32, illustrate a changing situation in the country of 
origin. H. Battjes adds that also a diplomat who stays abroad can claim 
a risk sur place if – for political reasons – an arrest warrant was issued in 
his case in his country of origin33.
Activities undertaken by an individual after leaving the country of 
origin can be of a different nature. Scholars claim that refugees sur place 
frequently refer to their conversion to a religion which is not tolerated 
by the authorities in the country of origin34, their political involvement35 
developments and judicial activism of the European Courts, London 2014, pp. 50-51. On a more 
reluctant approach to a risk sur place which is aresult of activities undertaken by an 
individual in: S. Da Lomba, supra note 20, p. 49.
29 A. Zimmermann, C. Mahler, supra note 21, p. 329.
30 Ibid., p. 329.
31 S. Velluti, supra note 28, p. 51.
32 UNHCR, Refugee Status Determination. Identifying who is a refugee. Self-study module 2, 
Geneva 2005, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search 
&skip=18&docid=43144dc52&query=definition%20of%20a%20refugee [last accessed: 
6.10.2017], p. 44.
33 H. Battjes, Piecemeal Engineering: The Recast of the Rules on Qualification for 
International Protection [in:] V. Chetail, P. De Bruycker, F. Maiani (eds.), Reforming the 
Common European Asylum System: The New European Refugee Law, Leiden/Boston 
2016, pp. 221-222. Recalling the fact that an arrest warrant can be valid within the while 
territory, it should also be stressed that it may also be invoked by asylum seekers who 
do not agree with an application of an internal flight alternative.
34 A. Zimmermann, C. Mahler, supra note 21, p. 329; E. Hamdan, The Principle of 
Non-Refoulement under the ECHR and the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Leiden/Boston 2016, pp. 260-261.
35 See e.g. G. Clayton, supra note 21, p. 448.
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and a likelihood of penalisation of activities taken by them in the country 
of destination36.
The ECtHR has already referred to the situation of a convert who 
was expected to return to his country of origin. In the judgment of 23 
March 2016 in F.G. v. Sweden37 the Court found that the applicant, who 
was baptised in Sweden after leaving Iran, decided “to keep his faith 
a private matter”38, but he provided status examination authorities with 
some indications that he based his asylum claim, among others, on a risk 
of ill-treatment which he would be exposed to after returning to Iran39. 
Therefore, according to the Court, Swedish authorities had to ensure ex 
nunc assessment on that ground and consider a general situation in Iran 
and the particular circumstances of the applicant’s situation40.
Considering the political involvement of refugees sur place, G. Clayton 
underlines that it must be of a genuine political interest41. Therefore, it 
cannot be of an opportunistic nature, so it cannot be motivated mainly 
or solely by a wish to obtain refugee status in a country of destination42.
S. Da Lomba43 and S. Velutti44 claim that a changing situation in the 
country of origin is more favourably looked at by national authorities 
than activities taken by an individual after leaving the country of rigin as 
the later “are suspected of being manufactured”45. H. Battjest argues that 
“Continuation of convictions is sufficient, but not necessarily required 
for recognition of a claim under the Refugee Convention. As to Articl  
3 ECHR (…) the intentions or purposes of a third country national are 
36 Those concepts are, however, questioned by national courts. More in: J.C. Hathaway, 
M. Foster, The Law of Refugee Status, Cambridge 2014, pp. 78.
37 Appl. no. 43611/11.
38 Ibid., para. 89.
39 Ibid., para. 157.
40 Ibid.
41 G. Clayton, supra note 21, p. 448. She recalls the judgment of England and Wales 
Court of Appeal – Civil Division judgment of Ahmed (Iftikhar) v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2000] INLR 1. The ECtHR referred to a genuine interest also in cases 
concerning religious activity taken in the country of destination. F.G. v. Sweden, para. 123.
42 G. Clayton, supra note 21 p. 448.
43 S. Da Lomba, supra note 20, p. 43-64.
44 S. Velluti, supra note 28, pp. 50-51.
45 Ibid.; S. Da Lomba, supra note 20, p. 43-64.
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immaterial for state responsibility in expulsion cases.”46. G.S. Goodwin-
Gill and J. McAdam add that “some European doctrine attaches particular 
importance to political activities sur place being a continuation of activities 
begun in the country of origin, this may be intended to go to the question 
on credibility and ‘well-foundedness’, as the ordinary meaning of article 
1A(2) [of the 1951 Geneva Convention] would imply”47. This notion, 
which was developed by German jurisprudence, is now widely applied48. 
Its popularity may be justified by the fact that the majority of claims 
submitted by refugees sur place are grounded on the political involvement 
of applicants49.
Political involvement can take different forms and it may include 
public (in media or in the Internet) expression of political views (e.g. 
criticizing a government of a country of origin). However, those activities 
must be sufficiently extensive to justify a risk sur place50.
Finally, some countries punish an unauthorised departure and/or 
submission of an application for asylum51. Regarding the former, ECRE 
convincingly stressed that “A political conviction may be attributed to 
the claimant by the persecutor, notwithstanding a lack of real political 
conviction on the part of the refugee claimant if, for example, the claimant 
has simply decided to extend a period abroad or did not return in 
ti e at the summons of a new government.”52. Regarding the later, in 
the judgment of the ECtHR of 26 July 2005 in N. v. Finland53 the Court 
underlined that the applicant may be exposed to persecution in the 
46 H. Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law, Leiden/Boston 2006, p. 261.
47 G.S. Goodwin-Gill, J. McAdam, supra note 21, p. 88.
48 A. Zimmermann, C. Mahler, supra note 21, p. 334.
49 Ibid., p. 330.
50 They will be considered as insufficient if he applicant would not be a high-profile 
activist or political opponent. Cf. F.G. v. Sweden, paras. 88 and 141. By contrast cf. S.F. and 
Others v. Sweden, judgment of 15.5.2012, appl. no. 52077/10, paras. 62-61.
51 A. Zimmermann, C. Mahler, supra note 21, p. 330. Those concepts are, however, 
questioned by national courts. More in: J.C. Hathaway, M. Foster, supra note 36, pp. 78.
52 ECRE, Position On The Interpretation Of Article 1 Of The Refugee Convention - September 
2000, available at: https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Position-on-the-
Interpretation-of-Article-1-of-the-Refugee-Convention_September-2000.pdf [last accessed 
on: 7.10.2017], point 40.
53 Appl. no. 38885/02.
20   |   Katarzyna Krupa-Lipińska 
 2.1.  ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH 
 
 The all-or-nothing approach is a result of a strict interpretation of the 
conditio sine qua non requirement. Case-law and doctrine in some European 
countries support this view. It is, then, crucial to establish a causal relation 
between the individually recognised tortfeasor and the damage and hold 
him/her liable in full16. Taking into account that the essence of problem  
of alternative causation is inherent evidentiary problems in establishing 
which tortfeasor actually caused the damage, some jurisdictions in which 
the all-or-nothing approach is accepted are using certain ways to overcome 
those difficulties for the plaintiff’s benefit. For example, in Belgium the 
court may be willing to find upon circumstances of the case that the 
damage was actually the result of the activity of one of defendants (his/her 
act was the actual cause of damage) and hold him/her liable17. In some 
jurisdictions facilitation for the plaintiff’s claim follows from the proper 
establishment of the standard of proof or burden of proof. In English18  
and Danish law the applicable standard of proof is the preponderance  
of evidence, which means that the requirement of causation is met if it is 
more probable than not (more than 50%) that the defendant caused  
the damage. A similar approach is taken by Italian law, which applies  
the “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicated ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
265The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Case of S.K. v. Russia…
Democratic Republic of Congo, because media commented widely on 
the asylum claim which he submitted in Finland54.
A risk of persecution arising in the country of origin may also be 
associated with criminal proceedings against an immigrant which took 
place in a country of destination. It may also extend to persons who were 
not found guilty55.
Comments devoted to the moment of time when a person becomes 
a refugee are important, as the situation in a country of origin may change 
rapidly and develop quickly (from local protests to an armed conflict). 
Therefore, a decision cannot refer to past events only. Instead, authorities 
must make an ex nunc assessment of the facts in asylum cases56 and an 
evaluation of a situation in the country of origin should be based on the 
most recent facts. Thus, the assessment should take into account data 
which are available at the moment of finalisation of an administrative 
procedure.
Certainly, the same rules apply in the case of stateless migrants who 
are expected to be returned to a country of their “habitual residence”. 
This was confirmed, among others, in the ECtHR judgment of 15 October 
2015 in L.M. and Others v. Russia57, where the applicant was a stateless 
Palestinian with a habitual residence in Syria.
Article 5 of the EU Qualification Directive (recast)58 provides additional 
guidelines concerning the extent of data which should be taken into 
account in a refugee status determination procedure. It also specifies that 
54 Strasbourg judges underlined that „It is relevant in this connection that the 
applicant himself does not appear to have played any active role in making his asylum 
case known to the public and, in particular, to other DRC nationals currently in Finland”. 
N. v. Finland, para. 165.
55 Cf. A. v. the Netherlands, judgment of 20.7.2010, appl. no. 4900/06. An applicant was 
accused of involvement in a terrorist organisation. His trial was widely commented on 
in the media. Therefore, he claimed that he would be imprisoned after a return to Libya, 
although in the Netherlands he was found not guilty.
56 Cf. J.K. v. Sweden, judgment of 23.8.2016, appl. no. 59166/12, para. 83; Sufi and Elmi 
v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28.6.2011, appl. nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, par. 215; 
F.G. v. Sweden, para. 115.
57 Appl. no. 40081/14, 40088/14 and 40127/14.
58 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 
2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons
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“a well-founded fear of being persecuted or a real risk of suffering serious 
harm may be based on events which have taken place since the applicant 
left the country of origin”. Nevertheless, the Directive has a binding effect 
only on the EU Member States. Thus, the ECtHR can feel inspired by its 
wording, but this will be only a non-binding reflection from other legal 
regimes. Therefore, making a reference to the Qualification Directive 
(recast) in the ECtHR’s judgments is more likely in the EU Member States’ 
cases as they are bound by the Directive anyway.
Information on a general risk in the country of return has to be 
contrasted with an individualized risk of persecution which a returnee 
could face upon arrival in that country. Therefore, decision-making 
authorities have to confront the applicant’s opinions (subjective ones) 
with information about the country of return (objective data which are 
delivered e.g. by non-government organizations)59. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that people fleeing because of the climate change cannot claim 
persecution60. 
In a refugee status determination procedure the likelihood of 
persecution does not have to be proved61. However, it has to be 
“reasonably possible”, although it does not have to be “conclusively
eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), OJ 
L 337 of 20.12.2011, pp. 9-26. See: S. Da Lomba, supra note 20, pp. 46-47.
59 J. Chlebny, supra note 24, p. 240 and 252. Compare with N.A. v. the United Kingdom, 
judgment of 17.7.2008, appl. no. 25904/07, paras. 120-122. More on the importance of using 
reliable information on the country of origin in: G. Gyulai, Country Information in Asylum 
Procedures. Quality as a Legal Requirement in the EU, Budapest 2011 (Updated version), 
passim. In the EU it is the European Asylum Support Office which shall organize, promote 
and coordinate activities relating to information on countries of origin. See Article 4 of the 
Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 
2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office (OJ L 132 of 29.5.2010, pp. 11-28). 
Reports of the European Asylum Support Office are available at: https://coi.easo.europa.
eu/ [last accessed: 11.7.2017].
60 M.M. Kenig-Witkowska, Problematyka „uchodźców środowiskowych” w prawie między-
narodowym [The category of ‘Environment Refugees’ in international law], “Państwo i Prawo” 
2013, no. 10, p. 16.
61 Compare with: M.A. Nowicki, Wokół Konwencji Europejskiej. Komentarz do Euro-
pejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka [The European Convention. Commentary to the European 
Convention on Human Rights], 7th ed., Warszawa 2017, p. 419.
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beyond doubt”62. Thus, the UNHCR correctly underlined that a minimum 
level of likelihood also has to be met as “not all levels of likelihood can 
be sufficient to give rise to refugee status. A key question is whether the 
degree of likelihood which has to be shown by the applicant to qualify for 
refugee status has been established.”63. Among other matters, authorities 
should consider previous persecutions faced by the asylum applicant, 
but results of these findings should not be the main factors influencing 
a decision, especially when a serious change in the country of origin has 
taken place64.
In the S.K. case the ECtHR found that an issue of a risk sur place was 
not considered by the Russian administration, even though the situation 
in Syria had changed since the applicant had left his country of origin65. 
As a consequence, the authorities could not establish whether S.K. was 
a refugee sur place.
Moreover, the Court specified that “the Contracting States’ 
responsibility (…) in cases of this kind lies in the act of exposing an 
individual to a real risk of death or ill-treatment”66. Thus, an evaluation 
of a situation in the country of origin has to take into account the most 
recent data67 which are available when authorities make a decision on 
granting refugee status.
Furthermore, the Court reiterated that removal to the country which 
was facing “a general situation of violence”68 can (in exceptional cases) 
lead to a violation of Article 3 of the 1950 Convention69. This extraordinary 
approach is therefore based on the concept of a sufficient level of intensity
62 J. Chlebny, supra note 24, p. 43.
63 UNHCR, Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, 16 December 1998, 
available at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b3338.pdf [last accessed: 29.6.2017], p. 1.
64 J. Chlebny, supra note 24, p. 43; Compare with: M.A. Nowicki, supra note 62, 
p. 420. Cf. J.K. v. Sweden, para. 102.
65 S.K., paras 60-62.
66 Ibid., par. 58.
67 On the requirements established in Directive 2013/32/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and 
withdrawing international protection (OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, pp. 60-95) in: C. Costello, 
E. Hancox, supra note 26, p. 401.
68 See S.K., par. 55 quoting L.M., par. 119.
69 This justification is in-line with: UNHCR, „Handbook”, point 165.
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of violence in the country of origin. Therefore, “the Court would adopt 
such an approach only in the most extreme cases of general violence, 
where there is a real risk of ill-treatment simply because the individual 
concerned will be exposed to such violence in that country”70. Therefore, 
as a rule, refugee status would be denied to applicants who refer to 
general mistreatment, which is associated with war71. However, the 
applicant may prove otherwise72.
In the present case an analysis of an “objective” risk sur place was 
essential as S.K. did not claim any subjective reasons which could 
justify his well-founded fear of individual persecution. Referring to the 
general situation in the country of return, the Court recalled reports 
from its judgment in L.M.73. Nevertheless, the ECtHR updated that 
information (the ECtHR was not satisfied with information provided 
by the government and the applicant, so it obtained information pro 
motu)74 by citing, among others, reports from the UNHCR, and the UK 
Home Office75.
Although the Court found that the applicant had not delivered 
any updates as regards the situation in Syria, it underlined that it was 
primarily the government’s responsibility to provide evidence that 
70 See S.K., par. 55 quoting L.M., par. 119. This idea can also be found in: F.G. v. Sweden, 
para. 129; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, par. 218; N.A. v. the United Kingdom, para. 115. 
Compare with Meki Elgafaji and Noor Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie (case C-465/07, 
judgment of 17.2.2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:94), para. 39 where that Court specified that “the 
more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically affected by reason of factors 
particular to his personal circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence 
required for him to be eligible for subsidiary protection”. However, an indiscriminate 
violence may also (but only in exceptional circumstances) justify granting international 
protection.
71 See Vilvarajah and others v. United Kingdom, judgment of 20.10.1991, appl. 
nos. 13163/87; 13164/87; 13165/87; 13447/87; 13448/87), par. 111. This view is shared by 
L. Garlicki, Art. 3. Zakaz tortur [Article 3. Prohibition of torture] [in:] L. Garlicki, P. Hofmański, 
A. Wróbel (eds.), Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności. Tom 
I. Komentarz do artykułów 1–18, Warszawa 2010, pp. 132-133. This approach was confirmed 
in NA, paras. 114-115.
72 The Court of Justice of the EU confirms that view. Cf. Meki, par. 37. Compare with: 
H. Battjes, supra note 33, pp. 233.
73 S.K., par. 46.
74 Ibid., par. 60.
75 Ibid., par. 47.
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a return to Syria would not expose S.K. to the risk of ill-treatment76. 
Therefore, the ECtHR reconfirmed that an “objective” risk sur place, which 
refers to well-known (freely ascertainable) information about a general 
risk in the country of origin, “entails that the authorities carry out an 
assessment of that risk of their own motion”77. In the present case, the 
Court found that the government had failed to meet that requirement. 
2. An internal flight alternative
In times of immigration crisis, a reference to an internal flight alterna-
tive (IPA, also called “internal protection alternative”78 and “internal 
relocation alternative”79) is an important guide to all the countries of 
the Council of Europe, including the EU Member States. C. Costello 
adequately identified that “Notwithstanding its lack of clear foundation 
in the [1951] Refugee Convention (...), this notion has now been institu-
tionalized in State practice and UNHCR guidelines”80 and the UNHCR’s 
76 Ibid., par. 59. More in: C. Costello, E. Hancox, supra note 26, p. 401.
77 F.G. v. Sweden, para. 126. Compare with Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, judgment of 
23.2.2012, appl. no. 27765/09, paras. 131-133 and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, judgment 
of 21.1.2011, appl. no. 30696/09, para. 366. If the S.K. would claim an individual risk, he 
would be obliged to prove it.
78 See e.g. J.C. Hathaway, M. Foster, Internal protection/relocation/flight alternative 
as an aspect of refugee status determination [in:] E. Feller, V. Türk, F. Nicholson (eds.), 
Refugee Protection in International Law. UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International 
Protection, Cambridge 2003, p. 357. The differences between the names of this concept 
are explained in: N. Kelley, Internal Flight/Relocation/Protection Alternative: Is It Reasonable, 
“International Journal of Refugee Law” 2002, vol. 14, issue 1, p. 5.
79 See e.g. M. Zard, Towards a Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Refugees and the 
Internally Displaced [in:] A. Fruma Bayefsky (ed.), Human Rights and Refugees, Internally 
Displaced Persons and Migrant Workers: Essays in Memory of Joan Fitzpatrick and Art ur 
Helton, Leiden/Boston 2006, p. 34.
80 C. Costello, supra note 27, p. 175. As regards the UNHCR she refers to: UNHCR, 
Guidelines on International Protection: “Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative” within the 
Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Doc. HCR/GIP/03/04 23 of July 2003. An origin of the internal flight alternative 
(the fact that it was an interpretation of the 1951 Geneva Convention) is also underlined 
in: L. Aldenhoff, G. Clayton, P. McDonough, Actors of Protection and the Application of 
the Internal Protection Alternative European Comparative Report, ECRE 2014, available t:
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“Handbook”81. This practice was developed ad hoc in the mid-1980s and 
quickly became commonly applied82. However, the concept of security 
in a part of the country of an immigrant’s origin is still questioned in 
the literature, although those views are rare nowadays83.
It is rather commonly agreed that there is “no reason in principle 
why an asylum seeker’s fear of persecution should relate to the whole of 
his or her country of origin”84. This is owing to the fact that even though 
a return to a place of a migrant’s former residence may not be possible, 
a return to other parts of that country may still be considered. Therefore, 
an asylum seeker will not meet the prerequisites envisaged in the 1951 
Geneva Convention, if in a part of the country of return:
• s/he will not face persecution and
• the state (or other actors who control the country or the part of 
the country) is able and willing to ensure the safety of persons 
staying in its territory85.
This approach reflects a subsidiary role of the international refugee 
law (in the context of the 1951 Geneva Convention)86 and international 
human rights law (in the context of the 1950 Convention). Nevertheless, 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe argued “that 
https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ECRE-Asylum-Aid-DCR-and-
HHC_Actors-of-Protection-and-the-Application-of-the-Internal-Protection-Alternative_
July-2014.pdf [last accessed on: 8.10.2017], p. 33.
81 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 23, point 91.
82 J.C. Hathaway, International Refugee Law: The Michigan Guidelines on the Internal 
Protection Alternative, Michigan Journal of International Law 1999, vol. 21, issue 1, p. 132. 
More on a history of an internal flight alternative in: J.C. Hathaway, M. Foster, supra note 
78, p. 359-361 and H. Storey, supra note 24, pp. 499-532.
83 Cf. G. Gilbert, Is Europe Living Up to Its Obligations to Refugees?, European Journal 
of International Law 2004, vol. 15, no. 5, p. 976; C. Teitgen-Colly, The European Union and 
Asylum: an Illusion of Protection, “Common Market Law Review” 2006, vol. 43, issue 6, 
p. 1519.
84 G.S. Goodwin-Gill, J. McAdam, supra note 21, p. 123.
85 Compare with: K. Keith, The Difficulties of Internal Flight and Internal Relocation 
as Frameworks of Analysis, “Georgetown Immigration Law Journal” 2001, vol. 15, p. 439 
and (on non-state agents) L. Aldenhoff, G. Clayton, P. McDonough, supra note 80, p. 28.
86 R. Marx, The Criteria of Applying the Internal Flight Alternative Test in National Refugee 
Status Determination Procedures, “International Journal of Refugee Law” 2002, vol. 14, 
issue 2&3, p. 182.
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asylum seekers should not be required to demonstrate that they have 
exhausted all the possibilities of reaching safety in an area within their 
own country (…) before seeking international protection”87.
G.S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam correctly claim that in some 
cases it may be “impossible or impracticable for the asylum seeker to 
move internally, rather than to cross an international frontier”88. K. Keith 
provides a striking example of persons who could safely stay in their 
country of origin only if they move to a remote desert or to the top of 
the mountain89. Other scholars underline that
“Because a state is presumed to be entitled to act throughout its territory, 
the IPA is ‘not normally a relevant consideration’ if there is a risk of b ing 
persecuted by a state actor. (…) Only where it is clear that the power of the 
state authority or agent is geographically limited or ‘where the State itself 
only has control over certain parts of the country’ can the IPA be considered 
in cases of state supported persecution. An IPA is more likely if the risk of 
persecution comes from a non-state actor.”90.
The UNHCR specified that a returnee must be able to “lead a relatively 
normal life without facing undue hardship”91 in a part of the country to 
which s/he is to be returned. Thus, not only physical security has to be 
concerned, but also respect for the
“basic civil, political and socio-economic human rights of the individual (…) 
[need to be ensured]. Questions of an economic nature, such as access to 
suitable employment, are not strictly relevant to the availability of protection, 
although the inability to survive elsewhere in the country may be another 
compelling reason to grant international protection. Another consideration 
in assessing the qualification of ‘reasonable’ includes an evaluation of the 
87 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 1440 (2000) on 
Restrictions on asylum in the member states of the Council of Europe and the European Union, 
Text adopted by the Assembly on 25 January 2000 (3rd Sitting), point 6.5.3.3. This view 
was also expressed in: N. Kelley, supra note 78, p. 15.
88 G.S. Goodwin-Gill, J. McAdam, supra note 21, p. 124.
89 K. Keith, supra note 85, p. 439. 
90 L. Aldenhoff, G. Clayton, P. McDonough, supra note 80, p. 35.
91 UNHCR, supra note 80, point 5(II)a.
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subjective circumstances surrounding the alleged persecution, such as the 
depth and quality of the fear itself.”92.
Other factors can also be considered e.g. the asylum seeker’s sex or family 
relations. Thus, a verification of the general situation in the country of 
origin as well as the personal circumstances of an asylum seeker is needed.
H. Storey concludes that asylum seekers should not be expected to 
demonstrate the unavailability of protection in the whole territory of 
their country of origin93. Supporters of that approach suggest that this 
obligation could overburden applicants94. L. Aldenhoff, G. Clayton, and 
P. McDonough go further and claim that “The state bears the burden of 
proving that a suitable IPA exists.”95. All of the above-cited scholars agree 
that an asylum seeker can be asked to demonstrate the unavailability of 
the protection in other parts of the country only after receiving a notice 
from a status determination authority about an intended application of an 
IPA96. However, it should be uncontested that an ex nunc assessment of 
the situation in the part of the country of origin should always take place.
A ditional guidelines on an application of an IPA can be found in the 
ECHR judgment of 11 January 2007 in Salah Skeekh v. The Netherlands97. 
The C urt specified that this concept may be applied if a person who is 
to be expelled will be able:
• to travel to the area concerned;
• to gain admittance to this area; and
• to settle there98.
92 UNHCR, An Overview of Protection Issues in. Western Europe: Legislative Positions 
Taken by UNHCR, European Series 1995, vol. 1, no. 3, Geneva September 1995, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/publications/euroseries/46e65e1e2/overview-protection-issues-
europe-legislative-trends-positions-taken-unhcr.html [last accessed on: 8.10.2017], pp. 64-
65. More on this issue in: N. Kelley, supra note 78, p. 24 and L. Aldenhoff, G. Clayton, 
P. McDonough, supra note 80, pp. 30-31.
93 H. Storey, supra note 24, pp. 507-509.
94 Ibid., pp. 507-509; R. Marx, supra note 86, p. 183.
95 L. Aldenhoff, G. Clayton, P. McDonough, supra note 80, p. 36.
96 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
97 Appl. no. 1948/04.
98 Ibid., para. 141. More in: E. Mak, The Sheltering Sky of Strasbourg; On the ECtHR’s 
judgment in the case of Salah Sheekh v.the Netherlands and its effects on asylum policy and 
judi ation in the Netherlands, “Europe & Law” 2007, no. 1, pp. 69-81.
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This reasoning can also be traced in EU law. Article 8(3) of Directive 
2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification 
and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees 
or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the 
content of the protection granted99 provided the possibility of applying 
an IPA, notwithstanding technical obstacles to return to the country 
of origin. This possibility was removed from Directive 2011/95/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status 
for refugees, or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the 
content of the protection granted (recast). Thus, the Directive envisages 
a need to ensure that a return is safe and legally available, which reflects 
the Salah Skeekh case100.
However, during the negotiations of Directive 2004/83/EC the 
EU Member States rejected the Commission’s proposal to ensure that 
a person to be returned “has access to protection against persecution or 
serious harm (…) in a part of a country of origin”. The same proposal 
was tabled again by the Commission when a draft of the recast of that 
Directive was negotiated. Nevertheless, as that draft was questioned 
by some EU Member States, Directive 2011/95/EU was adopte  in 
a wording suggested by the Presidency. Therefore, some scholars claim 
that protection level has not increased101.
Nevertheless, the adopted text envisaged an obligation to take into 
account the general situation in the country and personal circumstances of 
an applicant. As regards the latter, some scholars claim that the intention 
was to put the burden of proof on asylum applicants, although this is not 
clearly stated in the Directive102. If that were the case, applicants could 
be overburdened, as has already been discussed above.
The Directive contains a need to ensure that the person to be expelled 
must be reasonably expected to settle in the country of return. However,
99 OJ EU L 304 of 30.9.2004, pp. 12-23.
100 More in: H. Battjes, supra note 33, p. 210.
101 H. Battjes, supra note 33, p. 211.
102 Ibid., p. 212.
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as the text does not define what constitutes a “reasonable” expectation103, 
it does not guarantee that the status determination authority will consider 
the availability of basic social and economic rights in the country of origin. 
Thus, the already cited UNHCR’s suggestion that a returnee must be able 
to “lead a relatively normal life without facing undue hardship”104 is not 
explicitly reflected to in EU law. Nevertheless, it was observed that this 
notion is applied by the EU Member States in their practice105.
Finally, the Directive does not specify when a well-founded fear of 
persecution should be verified – is that obligation imposed before or after 
checking the availability of an IPA106. Therefore, different practices in that 
regard were noticed in the EU Member States107. Recalling that the second 
stage of development of a Common European Asylum System intended 
to “provide for a single, common procedure for reasons of efficiency, 
speed, quality, and fairness of the decisions”108, the wide discretion left 
to the EU Member States in that regard may be questioned.
In the S.K. case, the ECtHR did not call into question the legality of an 
IPA. What is more, it followed the already cited judgment of 28 June 2011 
in Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom109 and confirmed that a government 
has a right to maintain that an applicant would be safe and would not 
be exp sed to a risk of ill-treatment upon transit and arriving in his/her 
home town or settling in another part of the country of return110.
In t e S.K. case the Court was not provided with any well-justified 
evidence confirming that an individual assessment of possible ill-
treatment was carried out by the Russian authorities. Thus, the Strasbourg 
judges were not convinced that “the situation in Damascus is sufficiently 
safe for the applicant, who alleges that he would be drafted into active 
103 L. Aldenhoff, G. Clayton, P. McDonough, supra note 80, p. 37.
104 UNHCR, supra note 80, point 5(II)a.
105 L. Aldenhoff, G. Clayton, P. McDonough, supra note 80, pp. 60-63.
106 Ibid., p. 28.
107 Ibid., p. 68.
108 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
Regions – Policy plan on asylum – An integrated approach to protection across the EU, COM(2008) 
360 final, Brussels 17.6.2008, point 2.
109 In particular par. 267 of that judgment.
110 S.K., par. 62.
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military service, or that the applicant could travel from Damascus to 
a safe area in Syria”111. Therefore, the Court remained consistent with its 
L.M. judgment as regards the situation in Syria. In that way, the judgment 
is in line with the views of the EU as they have been set out in Directive 
2011/95/EU. As the general situation in Syria was not considered safe 
enough, the Court did not verify if S.K. could “lead a relatively normal 
life without facing undue hardship” after return.
Taking the above into account (both – the issue of a risk/refugees sur 
place as well as an IPA), the Court concluded that the applicant’s removal 
to Syria would violate Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention112.
3. Detention without likely prospects for removal
In the S.K. case, the applicant claimed that, even though his detention 
continued, he could not ask a national court to review the decision on 
his custody. The government responded that they had to prolong the 
detention, because S.K. submitted an application for temporary asylum. 
On that basis, authorities claimed that a return procedure was carried out 
with special diligence and the prolongation of the detention was a result 
of the applicant’s actions.
The ECtHR rejected the government’s view. The Court underlined 
that the applicant was not questioning his detention aiming at execution 
of his forcible administrative removal, but he was referring to his inability 
to obtain a judicial review of his detention after a certain lapse of time.
Russian law provided a possibility to ask for a reconsideration of 
a decision on imposing an administrative fine. As a result, a migrant 
could be released from detention, if a decision ordering an administrative 
removal was made void. Thus, a sanction could be lifted as a consequence 
of changes to a decision imposing a return order and – securing an 
execution of that order – a sanction (administrative detention). However, 
the sanction per se (detention) could not be questioned under Russian 
111 Ibid. The name of the specific part of the country to which a return is expected to 
take place should be clearly indicated in the decision. More in: L. Aldenhoff, G. Clayton, 
P. McDonough, supra note 80, p. 58.
112 S.K., par. 63.
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law. Therefore, during custody, immigrants could not expect a release 
nor could they be ordered any alternatives to detention. 
S.K. was not convicted of any criminal offence and his illegal stay 
in Russia was the only reason for his administrative removal113. The 
government did not claim that the applicant’s presence in Russia would 
constitute a threat to public security or public health. This, again, 
reconfirms that securing an execution of an administrative return decision 
was the only reason for putting the applicant in custody114.
The ECtHR considered that S.K. was kept in detention, although 
his return was unlikely “due to the worsening situation in Syria”115. 
Therefore, the idea that “States [must] demonstrate that deportation 
must be a realistic prospect”116 was confirmed also in this case. As in 
the ECtHR judgment of 19 February 2009 in A v. the United Kingdom117, 
it thus rejected the view that detention was justified because of keeping 
the possibility of removal “under active review”118.
Therefore, the authorities should have considered imposing 
alternatives to detention in the applicant’s case. However, as a decision 
on the applicant’s detention could not be reassessed, the situation 
of S.K. was similar to the one described in the judgment of 17 July 
2014 in Kim v. Russia119. Thus, the Court underlined that it “previously 
found violations of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention on account of the 
same statutory framework for detention of foreigners with a view to 
113 The fact that S.K. was already present in Russian territory differentiates the 
facts of this case from those of Saadi v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 29.1.2008, appl. 
no. 13229/03) where the application was submitted at the border and the applicant was 
detained.
114 As S.K. was asking for asylum it should be recalled that in principle the detention of 
persons applying for refugee status should be used exceptionally. See: Directive 2013/32/
EU, supra note 68 and UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion no. 44 (1986), Report of 
the 37th Session, UN doc. A/AC.96/688, par. 128. More in: G.S. Goodwin-Gill, J. McAdam, 
supra note 21, pp. 462-465.
115 S.K., par. 115. This view is alike the one in L.M., par. 148.
116 C. Costello, supra note 27, p. 291.
117 Appl. no. 3455/05.
118 Ibid., par. 167. See: M. Milanovic, European Court decides A and others v. United 
Kingdom, EJIL Talk! of 19 February 2009, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/european-
co rt-decides-a-and-others-v-united-kingdom/ [last accessed: 18.7.2017].
119 Appl. no. 44260/13, par. 148.
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administrative removal (…) [and therefore it] finds no sufficient reason 
to reach a different conclusion in the present case.”120.
This reasoning can also be traced in EU law121. In the Kadzoev case122, 
the CJEU made it clear that detention for the purpose of removal and 
detention for ensuring asylum procedure “fall under different legal 
rules”123. In its later judgment in the Arslan case124, it specified that when 
a person applies for asylum, Directive 2008/115/EC does not apply.
Moreover, Directive 2013/32/EU clearly states that as a rule, 
persons applying for international protection should not be detained. 
Nevertheless, during negotiations, EU Member States added to the 
Commission a proposal125 that a person may be detained if a return 
procedure is carried out against that person126.
Even though it does not apply to asylum seekers, but to illegally 
resident immigrants, Article 15(4) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals127 should also be mentioned. It explicitly states 
that when it appears that a reasonable prospect of removal no longer 
exists, detention ceases to be justified and the person concerned must b  
released immediately. The same applies when there is no longer a risk of 
absconding or of avoiding or hampering the preparations for return. In 
every case, detention shall be reviewed at reasonable intervals of time, 
either on application by the third-country national concerned or ex officio. 
120 S.K., par. 116.
121 Directive 2013/32/EU, supra note 68.
122 Said Shamilovich Kadzoev (Huchbarov), case C-357/09 PPU, judgment of 30.11.2009, 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:741.
123 Compare with: E. Tsourdi, EU Reception Conditions: A Dignified Standard of Living 
for Asylum Seekers? [in:] V. Chetail, P. De Bruycker, M. Francesco, Reforming the common 
European asylum system: the new European Refugee law, Leiden 20167, p. 290.
124 Mehmet Arslan v. Policie ČR, Krajské ředitelství policie Ústeckého kraje, odbor cizinecké 
policie, case C-534/11, judgment of 30.5.2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:343.
125 European Commission, Amended proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection status (Recast), COM/2011/0319 final – COD 2009/0165, Brussels, 
1.6.2011.
126 E. Tsourdi, supra note 123, p. 289.
127 OJ L EU 348 of 24.12.2008, pp. 98-107.
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In the case of prolonged detention periods, reviews shall be subject to 
the supervision of a judicial authority.
Taking the above-cited regulations into account, it can be said that 
the EU law is coherent with guarantees which were referred to by the 
ECtHR in the S.K. judgment.
V. A non-pilot judgment
The already quoted text, namely that “the Court finds no sufficient reason 
to reach a different conclusion in the present case”128, may seem as an 
expression of an annoyance of the judges. This would not be surprising 
as the ECtHR repetitively finds that Russia violates Article 5 § 1 of the 
Convention. Nevertheless, in the S.K. the Court did not used a pilot 
judgment option. The Strasbourg judges also decided not to make a quasi-
pilot judgment, which (according to M. Lubiszewski and J. Czepek129) 
is a less-intrusive interference into a national legal system. This policy 
is therefore non-coherent with the one applied in the recent Novruk 
v. Russia130 case.
In the S.K. case, the Russian authorities have not executed the 
judgments of L.M. and of Kim. Especially, the later decision is important 
in the S.K. case. This is due to the fact that Kim was a pilot judgment in 
which the Court found a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the 1950 Convention 
128 S.K., par. 116.
129 M. Lubiszewski, J. Czepek, Procedura wyroku pilotażowego w praktyce Europejskiego 
Trybunału Praw Człowieka [A Pilot Judgment Procedure in Practice of the European Court of 
Human Rights], Warszawa 2016, p. 140. Compare with: B. Gronowska, Europejski Trybunał 
Praw Człowieka. W poszukiwaniu efektywnej ochrony praw jednostki [The European Court of 
Human Rights. Searching an Effective Defeat of the Rights of an Individual], Toruń 2011, p. 77.
130 Appl. nos. 31039/11, 48511/11, 76810/12, 14618/13 and 13817/14, par. 93. The 
case considered return decisions which were issued to HIV-positive immigrants who had 
been refused a residence permit in Russia. See: P. Sadowski, Odmowa udzielenia zezwolenia 
na pobyt cudzoziemcowi-nosicielowi wirusa HIV – glosa do wyroku Europejskiego Trybunału Praw 
Człowieka z 15.03.2016 r. w sprawie Novruk i inni przeciwko Rosji (skargi nr 31039/11, 48511/11, 
76810/12, 4618/13 i 13817/14) [Refusal of a residence permit for HIV-positive foreigners – 
commentary on European Court of Human Rights judgment of 15 March 2016 in case Novruk 
and Others v. Russia (Applications nos. 31039/11, 48511/11, 76810/12, 14618/18 and 13817/14)], 
“Euro ejski Przegląd Sądowy” 2017, issue 6, pp. 44-47.
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on account of the unreasonable duration of the applicant’s detention131. 
On the above-mentioned findings, the Strasbourg judges “that the 
respondent State envisage taking the necessary general measures to 
limit detention periods so that they remain connected to the ground of 
detention applicable in an immigration context”132.
In the L.M. case, the ECtHR limited itself to an indication of individual 
measures for the execution of those judgments. It can be asked whether 
the Court took into account that in the L.M. case a decision was made 
15 months after Kim. However, 31 months passed from the Kim to the 
S.K. and in that time the Court found “in a number of cases” violations of 
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. Thus, the existence of a certain problem, 
which caused in the past or may cause in the future similar applications133, 
can be said to be met in the S.K. case. Therefore, the Court’s perspective 
and analysis of reasons for the non-implementation of Kim could be 
useful. It could especially help to understand why repetitive cases 
which were judged after the Kim case have not resulted in another pilot 
judgment. Unfortunately, without these guidelines from Strasbourg, we 
can make only a more or less accurate supposition in that regard.
Firstly, it can be asked whether the Court considered the efficiency 
of the protection of the human rights of foreigners staying in Russia. 
An insufficient level of protection could justify the reluctance of the 
ECtHR to issue a pilot judgment – this careful approach provides asylum 
seekers, who are under Russian jurisdiction, with a possibility of seeking 
a remedy in Strasbourg only if they have exhausted domestic remedies. 
That supposition is based on the Russian government’s unwillingness 
to amend national legislation if the Court’s decision is considered to be 
against Russian interests134.
Secondly, according to M.A. Nowicki the Strasbourg Tribunal is still 
rather reluctantly using pilot judgment procedure – in 2011 there were 
131 Kim, par. 72.
132 Ibid.
133 More on those tests in: L.R. Glas, The Functioning of the Pilot-Judgment Procedure of 
the European Court of Human Rights in Practice, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 
2016, vol. 34, issue 1, pp. 41-70.
134 Like in Alekseyev v. Russia, judgment of 21.10.2010, appl. nos. 4916/07, 25924/08 
and 14599/09 or in Novruk case. See comments to the latter case in: P. Sadowski, supra 
note 130, pp. 44-37.
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just 5 judgments of this type (and some quasi-pilot ones)135. Nevertheless, 
it seems that this trend is changing. Especially “since Protocol no. 14 
to the Convention entered into force, the Court has taken on a more 
proactive role in this process, by handing down an increasing number 
of pilot judgments or ‘quasi-pilot judgments’; however, this practice has 
also been called into question by some of the Court’s judges, the CDDH, 
and certain legal experts”136.
VI. Conclusions
The judgment in the S.K. v. Russia case comes at a very timely moment. The 
ECtHR correctly referred to the present situation in Syria and reiterated 
the rules governing the application of the concept of a risk/refugee sur 
place. In that context, an evaluation of a general risk of ill-treatment is 
particularly valuable.
Although the Court did not consider in detail an application of the 
tests which are applied in a context of an IPA, the judgment contains 
an important reflection on the “continuing hostilities in Syria (…) as 
well as on account of the possibility that he [the applicant] would be 
dr fted into active military service, thus intensifying the risks to his life 
and limb”137. The Court underlined the need to take into account the 
most recent information on the situation in the country of return and it 
recalled that it can act pro motu in that regard138. It also stressed that it 
is the responsibility of a government to provide a well-grounded and 
individualized justification for the possibility of applying an IPA139.
Finally, the general situation of indiscriminate violence in Syria was 
used by the ECtHRs to decide that the detention of S.K. was carried out 
135 M.A. Nowicki, Wokół Konwencji Europejskiej. Komentarz do Europejskiej Konwencji 
Praw Człowieka [The European Convention. Commentary to the European Convention on Human 
Rights], 6 ed., Warszawa 2013, p. 231.
136 Explanatory memorandum by M. Mr Pierre-Yves Le Borgn’, rapporteur [in:] Committee 
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Implementation of judgments of the European Court 
of Human Rights: 9th report, par. 50.
137 S.K., par. 57.
138 Ibid., par. 60.
139 Ibid., par. 62.
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the “theory of the most probable cause”. 
 
 2.2.  JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY 
 
 In Book VI – 4:103 of Draft Common Frame of Reference the rebuttable 
presumption of causing damage in the case of alternative causes is 
prescribed. The article reads as follows: “Where legally relevant damage 
may have been caused by any one or more of a number of occurrences  
for which different persons are accountable and it is established that the 
damage was caused by one of these occurrences but not which one, each 
person who is accountable for any of the occurrences is rebuttably 
                                                   
16  See: Infantino, Zervogianni, supra note 4. 
17  See: Court of Appeal of Brussels, 23.12.1927, RGAR 1928, no. 227. 
18  Solution to the problem of alternative causation in England is one of the most 
complicated ones. Depending on a case, it may be also proportional liability or joint and 
several liability (see below). 
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without realistic prospects of the applicant’s removal. In that regard the 
Court referred to “the worsening situation in Syria”140. The Strasbourg 
judges underlined that in that case, the authorities should consider 
imposing alternatives to detention. Moreover, the Court reiterated that in 
all the cases involving detention there is a need to ensure that a detainee 
has the possibility of asking for a reconsideration of a decision on his/
her detention.
Taking the above into account, the judgment refers to essential 
guarantees, which have to be ensured in a refugee status determination 
procedure. It reconfirms obligations which were put on the Council 
of Europe. Thus, it is welcomed that the Court tried to justify it well. 
Therefore, it should be appreciated that in the S.K. the ECtHR:
• remained consistent with the judgment of 15 October 2015 in L.M. 
and Others v. Russia as regards returns to Syria,
• reiterated the 17 July 2008 decision in N.A. v. the United Kingdom141 
on evaluation of a real risk of ill-treatment in return cases and
• reiterated its findings from the 17 July 2014 judgment in Kim 
v. Russia on the possibility of reviewing a decision on the detention 
of a migrant, and opted for application of alternatives to detention 
when a return is unlikely.
140 Ibid., par. 115. This view is similar to the one in L.M., par. 148.
141 Appl. no. 25904/07.

